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The Role of Diasporas in Foreign 
Policy: The Case of Canada
Marketa Geislerova1
Re ecting a subtle but profound shift in recent Canadian foreign policy 
priorities, the tsunami of last year, the chaos in Haiti, the exploding troubles in 
Sudan are not foreign-aid issues for Canada, they are foreign-policy priorities. 
They re  ect our demography transformation from predominantly European to 
truly multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are our problems 
because India and China are our motherlands.
John Ibbitson (Globe and Mail, 5 August 2005)
Foreign policy is not about loving everyone or even helping everyone. It is not 
about saying a nation cannot do anything, cannot go to war, for example, for fear 
of offending some group within the country or saying that it must do something 
to satisfy another group’s ties to the Old Country. Foreign Policy instead must 
spring from the fundamental bases of a state – its geographical location, its 
history, its form of government, its economic imperatives, its alliances, and yes, 
of course, its people. In other words National Interests are the key.
Jack Granatstein (Canadian Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Institute Conference, October 2005)
Societies around the world are becoming increasingly diverse. The myth of 
an ethnically homogeneous state that dominated international relations in the 
past century has been largely discarded. Propelled by a myriad of causes inclu-
ding, the nature of con  icts, environmental degradation and persistent econo-
mic and demographic gaps, people are on the move. While migration has been 
a constant trait of the international system for centuries, what is new today are 
1 Marketa Geislerova is a senior policy analyst at the Policy Research Division at the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada. She may be contacted at: 
marketa.geislerova@international.gc.ca. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of 
the author. While some conclusions re  ect information obtained in interviews with of  cials 
from the Canadian government they do not re  ect the positions and policies of the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
The Use and Effectiveness  
f Migration Controls  
as a Counter-Terrorism Instrument  
in the European Union
Sarah Leonard1
Introduction Migration Controls and EU Counter-Terrorism
Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the issue of the linkages 
between security concerns, in particular terrorism, and asylum and migration 
policies in the European Union (EU) has received an increasing amount of 
scholarly attention (see Guild, 2003a; Guild, 2003 ; Bal accini and Guild, 2007; 
Boswell, 2007; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Chebel d’Appolonia and Reich, 2008a; 
Givens et al , 2009; Winterdyk and Sundberg, 2010)  Most schola s have argued 
that security concer s have led to t e strengthening of border controls and the 
tightening up f asylum and migration policies in Europe, at both the national a d 
EU levels  As a 
internati nal protection a d for would-be migrants to legally move to another 
country (see notably Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Chebel d’Appolo ia and Reich, 
2008a; Givens et al , 2009)  Thus, the impact of security concerns, including ter-
rorism, on the EU asylum and migration poli y has been rather well-docum ted 
to date  However, less attention has been given to the r lated, albeit different, 
question of the role of migration controls in the EU’s counter-terrorism policy  
T  a  broader trend in the literature on counter-
terrorism, which tends to focus more on counter-terrorism strategies such as 
the use of force or intelli ence gathering than on other measures such as migra-
tion controls (see, for example, Martin, 2006; Harmon, 2008)  This is actually 
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controls can play by allowing, or not, the entry into a specific country of persons 
seeking to commit terrorist acts (Bullock et al ., 2006: 205) . In addition, the 
issue of migration controls may have been particularly neglected in studies of 
the EU counter-terrorism policy because of the commonly held perception that 
European countries rely less on such measures than other countries, the United 
States in particular (Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, 2008b: 7) . 
As a consequence, the present paper aims to address this specific issue of 
the role of migration controls in the EU counter-terrorism policy . By ‘migration 
controls’, it is meant the controls that are exercised on those wishing to enter the 
territory of a specific country, such as visas and controls at the physical border 
sites . In the context of the EU, where internal border controls have been abolished 
– with a few exceptions2 –, ‘migration controls’ refer to the controls exercised 
on non-EU nationals wishing to cross the external borders of the Member States 
of the EU (also known as ‘third country nationals’ in EU policy) .3
The article starts by tracing back the inclusion and development of migra-
tion controls as one of the EU counter-terrorism policy instruments . Then, it 
examines the various migration control measures that are currently used by the 
EU to fight terrorism, as well as their effectiveness . As this is a very dynamic 
policy area, the following section examines several measures that are currently 
being negotiated by EU policy-makers as an indication of the new migration 
control measures that may become part of the EU counter-terrorism policy in 
the future . After showing that migration control measures have become increas-
ingly important in the EU counter-terrorism strategy, the paper questions the 
extent to which this is a positive policy development when one considers both 
the effectiveness and the negative externalities of increased migration controls . 
The Role of Migration Controls in the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy
The development of EU cooperation on counter-terrorism is a relatively 
recent phenomenon . Although operational cooperation on issues of internal 
security such as terrorism already began in the 1970s amongst European states 
2 Five states (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg) decided to abol-
ish controls at their internal borders by signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which was 
followed by the adoption of the Schengen Convention in 1990 and led to the creation of the 
‘Schengen area .’ Schengen provisions were later brought into the EU framework with the adop-
tion of the Amsterdam Treaty . However, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland never 
joined the Schengen area . Nowadays, it comprises 25 states – all the EU Member States, apart 
from the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as 
three states that are not members of the EU (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) .
3 Although EU nationals seeking to enter the EU after a stay outside the EU are subject to 
border controls, those are different from the migration controls that are examined in this 
article . EU immigration policy provisions do not apply to EU citizens, as they are subject to 
other legal provisions relating to free movement in the EU .
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within the TREVI Group, it is only in 1993 that cooperation on terrorism was 
formally included in the EU framework with the adoption of the Treaty of 
Maastricht (Mitsilegas, 2009b: 10) . However, for a few years, EU achievements 
in this policy area remained rather modest for a variety of reasons, a detailed 
examination of which is beyond the scope of this article (Argomaniz, 2009) . It 
suffices to say that the events of 11 September 2001 gave a significant impulse 
to the development of EU activities against terrorism (Bures, 2006; Zimmer-
mann, 2006; Argomaniz, 2009; Kaunert, 2007; 2010) . The analysis of the role 
of migration control measures in the EU counter-terrorism policy will therefore 
focus on post-9/11 policy developments . 
In the first phase of the development of the EU’s post-9/11 response to 
terrorism, migration controls were not identified as a priority . Some measures 
relating to migration controls, such as the reinforcement of controls at external 
borders, the establishment of a network for exchanging information on visas 
issued and the improvement of the input of alerts into the Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS) (see below) were mentioned in the Anti-Terrorism Roadmap 
adopted on 26 September 2001 . However, those were listed alongside 43 other 
measures and were not given much substance . Also, whilst the deadline for 
the reinforcement of controls at external borders was identified as ‘as soon 
as possible’, no deadline was stipulated for the other two measures .  In addi-
tion, migration controls had not been identified as a priority by the European 
Council when it met in an extraordinary session on 21 September 2001 ‘in 
order to analyse the international situation following the terrorist attacks in 
the United States and to impart the necessary impetus to the actions of the 
European Union’ (European Council, 2001a: 1) . The European Council Conclu-
sions and Plan of Action identified the priorities for the development of the EU 
counter-terrorism policy as follows: (1) enhancing police and judicial coopera-
tion; (2) developing international legal instruments; (3) ending the funding of 
terrorism; (4) strengthening air security and (5) coordinating the EU’s global 
action . Thus, strengthening migration and border controls was not identified as 
a priority in the first phase of the development of the EU’s post-9/11 response 
to terrorism . In the first months following the terrorist attacks, the EU rather 
focused on enhancing police and judicial cooperation on counter-terrorism 
amongst EU Member States, with the adoption of important instruments such 
as the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and the European Arrest 
Warrant, and tackling terrorist financing (see Kaunert, 2007; 2010) . 
The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted on 25 March 2004, in the 
wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid, represented a turning point with regard 
to the use of migration controls in EU counter-terrorism . For the first time, 
migration control measures were clearly identified as a priority in the develop-
ment of the EU counter-terrorism policy . Section 6 of the Declaration was 
entitled ‘Strengthening border controls and document security’ and called for 
‘[expediting] work on measures in this area’, including the establishment of the 
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European Borders Agency, the adoption of a Council Directive on the obliga-
tion of carriers to communication passenger data and the adoption of proposals 
for the incorporation of biometric features into passports and visas . In addition, 
Section 5 of the Declaration on ‘Building on existing cooperation’ emphasised 
the importance of ‘maximising the effectiveness of information systems’, most 
of which (Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS) 
and EURODAC) contain data pertaining to asylum and migration matters as 
will be explained in greater detail below . In addition, Annex 1 of the Declara-
tion identified seven strategic objectives for the EU to combat terrorism, the 
fourth of which was ‘to ensure effective systems of border control’ (European 
Council, 2004: 15) . There were two main reasons for the increased emphasis 
placed on migration controls as an instrument of EU counter-terrorism . First 
of all, the location of the March 2004 terrorist attacks - on European soil, in 
contrast with the attacks on 11 September 2001 - had a profound effect on the 
EU counter-terrorism policy . These events accelerated the development of the 
EU counter-terrorism policy and led to a considerable expansion of its scope 
(Argomaniz, 2009; see also Lugna, 2006; Bossong, 2008) . Secondly, the fact 
that most perpetrators of the Madrid terrorist attacks were non-EU nationals 
(first-generation migrants from Morocco in this case) led EU policy-makers to 
give increased attention to migration controls as a dimension of EU counter-
terrorism .
In the revised Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism adopted in June 
2004, the importance of ensuring effective systems of border control was once 
more presented as one of the seven EU strategic objectives to combat terrorism 
(Council of the European Union, 2004) . In addition, as this Action Plan was 
considerably more detailed than any of its predecessors, the objectives of the 
EU in this policy area were presented in greater detail for the first time and most 
of them were assigned deadlines for their completion . In addition to this Plan 
of Action on Combating Terrorism, which was to be updated every six months, 
the EU adopted a Counter-Terrorism Strategy in December 2005 . It is based 
on four pillars: ‘prevent’, ‘protect’, ‘pursue’ and ‘respond .’ ‘Prevent’ refers to 
activities aiming to tackle the root causes of terrorism, whilst ‘protect’ concerns 
activities aiming to decrease the vulnerability of people and infrastructures to 
terrorist attacks . ‘Pursue’ refers to the investigation of terrorist activities, whilst 
‘respond’ concerns the reactions to terrorist attacks (Council of the European 
Union, 2005) . Again, migration control measures were given a prominent place 
under the ‘protect’ heading as evidenced by the following excerpt of the EU 
Strategy:
We need to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder for 
known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU . Improve-
ments in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, 
and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, 
will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater 
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assurance to our citizens . The European Borders Agency (Frontex) will 
have a role in providing risk assessment as part of the effort to strengthen 
controls and surveillance at the EU’s external border . The establishment of 
the Visa Information System and second generation Schengen Information 
System will ensure that our authorities can share and access information 
and if necessary deny access to the Schengen area (Council of the European 
Union, 2005: 10) .
In addition, under the heading ‘pursue,’ it was noted that ‘the development 
of new IT systems such as the Visa Information System and the next genera-
tion Schengen Information System, while safeguarding data protection, should 
provide improved access to those authorities responsible for internal security 
thereby widening the base of information at their disposal’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2005: 13) . Thus, the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
confirmed the increasing importance of migration controls as an EU counter-
terrorism instrument .
Since then, an increasing number of migration control measures have been 
included in reports on the implementation of the EU Action Plan on Combating 
Terrorism and in updated versions of the Action Plan . On the one hand, this 
testifies to the growing importance of migration controls as an EU counter-
terrorism instrument . On the other hand, it is important to emphasise that not 
all EU migration control measures contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
contrary to what their inclusion in EU counter-terrorism documents seems to 
suggest . The main purpose of most migration control measures is to prevent 
irregular migration, rather than fighting terrorism . Indeed, in recent years, sev-
eral measures have been adopted to enhance cooperation on external border 
controls amongst Member States and to strengthen border controls . In the area 
of external border management, the main aim of the EU is to develop an inte-
grated management of the borders, with a view to ensuring a high and uniform 
level of control of persons and surveillance at the external borders . ‘Integrated 
Border Management’ (IBM) covers all the activities of the public authorities of 
the Member States relating to border control and surveillance, including border 
checks, the analysis of risks at the borders, and the planning of the personnel 
and facilities required .4 
4 This concept has influenced the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
since the adoption of the Tampere programme in 1999 and was precisely defined by the Coun-
cil in 2006 . The Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management outlined the five 
main dimensions of IBM: (1) border control, which includes border checks, border surveil-
lance and relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence; (2) the detection and investigation of 
cross-border crime; (3) the ‘four-tier access control model’ (which includes activities in third 
countries, cooperation with neighbouring third countries, controls at the external border sites, 
and inland border control activities inside the Schengen area); (4) inter-agency cooperation 
for border management and international cooperation; and (5) coordination and coherence of 
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Consequently, it can be argued that only some of the EU migration control 
measures significantly contribute to the EU’s fight against terrorism . For exam-
ple, the creation of FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union) has often been presented by the EU as a significant step forward 
in the development of the EU counter-terrorism activities . However, its main 
competences are in the area of border security rather than counter-terrorism . One 
of its main responsibilities is to coordinate joint operations with Member States 
at the external borders of the EU Member States in order to prevent irregular 
migration . Given that it is highly unlikely that prospective terrorists would be 
attempting to reach the EU on one of the unseaworthy boats in the Mediterranean 
on which the attention of FRONTEX has been focused in the last few years, this 
type of activities cannot be seen as combating terrorism . The Agency also carries 
out risk analyses and follows up research relevant for the control and surveillance 
of borders . It is possible that the Agency may deal with terrorism issues when con-
ducting these activities, but this has actually not been the focus of its work to date 
(Leonard, 2009) . It is therefore important to identify migration control measures 
that contribute to combating terrorism amongst all EU migration control measures . 
In the next two sections, this article examines the migration control measures that 
are currently part of the EU counter-terrorism policy and those that are presently 
being negotiated in the EU and might become part of it in the future . Rather than 
following the all-inclusive approach characterising EU counter-documents, the 
article focuses on the border control measures that can make a substantial, rather 
than tangential, contribution to the EU’s fight against terrorism . 
Current Migration Control Measures used by  
the EU to Fight Terrorism and their Effectiveness
There are currently three main migration control measures that significantly 
contribute to fighting terrorism in the EU: the cooperation on visas, the shar-
ing of Advanced Passenger Information (API) and checks at the EU external 
borders . The remainder of this section examines each of them in turn and briefly 
comments upon their effectiveness .
EU Cooperation on Short-term Visas
Before examining EU cooperation on visas, it is important to define a visa 
as a document issued in the country where an individual resides (or where he 
originates from) by the country to which (s)he wishes to go . Visa cooperation 
amongst EU Member States has been mainly prompted by the abolition of 
the activities of the Member States and institutions, as well as other bodies of the Community 
and the Union . 
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internal border controls within the Schengen area5 . Lifting these internal border 
controls meant that the holder of a visa to one of the Schengen countries was 
also able to freely travel to any of the other Schengen countries . This situation 
led EU Member States to increase their cooperation on various aspects of their 
visa policies . It is important to emphasise at this stage that EU cooperation on 
visas focuses on short-term visas (i .e . three months), such as the visas given 
to tourists or businessmen, although EU Member States also cooperate on 
some specialised visa documents (Hobolth, 2010) . The key-issues on which 
EU Member States cooperate are the list of countries whose nationals must 
have a visa to enter the EU, the procedures for issuing visas, as well as the 
definition of a uniform visa format . Since 2001, there have been two visa lists: 
one ‘white’ list, listing countries whose nationals are not required to have a visa 
to enter the EU, and a ‘black’ list comprising the countries whose nationals are 
required to have a visa to cross the external borders of the EU . As of 2008, the 
black list comprised 130 countries (i .e . almost all the countries in the Middle 
East, South Asia, Central Asia and Africa) . The procedures and conditions for 
issuing visas are defined in the Visa Code (Regulation EC 810/2009), which 
has recently recast previous legislation such as the old ‘Schengen Decisions’ 
and the Common Consular Instructions . In order to be granted a visa, applicants 
must possess valid travel documents and may be asked to justify (and docu-
ment) the purpose of their visit and means of subsistence . In addition, they 
must not be registered in the Schengen Information System, which is a database 
that became operational in 1995 to support the implementation of the rules 
governing the Schengen area . This database notably contains alerts for the 
purpose of refusing entry . According to Article 21 of the Visa Code, ‘particular 
consideration shall be given to assessing whether the applicant presents a risk 
of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the Member States .’ The same 
article also requires consulates to specifically verify that ‘the applicant is not 
considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security or public health (…) 
or to the international relations of any of the Member States .’ In other words, 
from the point of view of the fight against terrorism, the officials processing 
a visa application are required to ensure that the applicant does not represent 
a security risk, such as a terrorist risk . This is done through security controls 
such as a search of the entry refusal files in the Schengen Information System, 
as well as the consultation of the central authorities of the countries concerned .
EU Sharing of Advanced Passenger Information (API)
Further specific controls apply to persons travelling by air to the EU . Coun-
cil Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 requires Member States to establish 
an obligation for carriers to transmit, at the request of the authorities responsible 
for carrying out checks on persons at external borders, by the end of check-in, 
5 See footnote 2 .
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information concerning the passengers they will carry . This ‘advanced passen-
ger information’ (API) comprises the following: the number and type of travel 
document used, the nationality, the full names, the date of birth, the border 
crossing point of entry into the territory of the Member States, the code of 
transport, the departure and arrival time of the transportation, the total number 
of passengers carried on that transport and the initial point of embarkation .
Checks at EU External Borders
All third country nationals are subject at entry to a ‘thorough check’ ac-
cording to the Schengen Borders Code . In addition to examining the travel 
documents and their validity, border guards verify the purpose and length of 
stay of the travellers and whether they possess sufficient means of subsistence . 
They also systematically search the Schengen Information System and national 
databases to check that travellers from a third country do not represent a threat 
to public policy, internal security, public health and the international relations 
of the Schengen states . In other words, it is tested whether several criteria are 
met through questions put to the travellers . Border guards also manually stamp 
the travel documents of third country nationals crossing the external border in 
order to indicate the date and place of entry and exit .
How Effective are these EU Migration Control 
Measures in Fighting Terrorism?
EU institutions regularly state that reinforcing migration controls, such as 
border controls, and EU cooperation in this policy area is important for combat-
ing terrorism . For example, a Communication of the European Commission 
in 2008 argued that ‘[b]order surveillance has not only the purpose to prevent 
unauthorised border crossings, but also to counter cross-border crime such 
as the prevention of terrorism’ (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008b: 3) . According to the Council (Council of the European Union, 2009), 
‘[EU Member States] need to enhance protection of [their] external borders 
to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within 
the EU .’ At the same time, the European Commission has also been seen as 
expressing some scepticism towards the effectiveness of migration controls in 
combating terrorism:
[in] view of the latest terrorist acts in the EU, it can be noted that the perpe-
trators have been mainly EU citizens or foreigners residing and living in the 
Member States with official permits . Usually there has been no information 
about these people or about their terrorist connections in the registers, for 
example in the SIS or national databases (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a: 10) .
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To date, there has not been any systematic assessment of the effective-
ness of migration control measures as an EU counter-terrorism instrument . It 
is nevertheless possible to offer some reflections on the effectiveness of the 
instruments presented above . With regard to EU cooperation on short-term 
visas, and with respect to travellers from the countries that are still subject to the 
visa obligation, the visa application system involves a first security check that 
is conducted before travellers have left their country of origin or residence . In 
theory, this type of checks can contribute to combating terrorism . However, this 
is difficult to assess because of the lack of availability of precise information . 
Data on the numbers of visas applied for and refused is available . According 
to Hobolth (2010), the annual refusal rate across the EU has been about 7% 
in the last few years . However, data documenting the reasons for which visas 
have been refused has not been readily available to date, as EU Member States 
refusing to grant a short-term visa have traditionally not been legally obliged to 
motivate their decision . It has therefore been impossible to identify the number 
of persons who have been refused a visa because they were assessed as posing 
a security (terrorist) threat to the EU .6 Thus, one can argue that, in general, EU 
cooperation on short-term visas contributes to the EU fight against terrorism 
because it ensures that EU states share information on persons to whom entry 
should be refused, including on grounds of national security, and that such 
persons are subsequently refused a visa . From that viewpoint, EU visa coopera-
tion may contribute to decreasing the terrorist threat in the EU . However, to 
date, it has been impossible to know how many prospective terrorists have been 
refused a visa, as not even the number of visas refused on security grounds 
has been made publicly available . Consequently, it is impossible to assess the 
precise contribution that short-term visa cooperation has made to the EU’s fight 
against terrorism . 
Assessing the extent to which external border checks contribute to fighting 
terrorism in the EU is no easier task . One of the key-aspects of these checks is 
the search of the Schengen Information System (SIS) to verify that travellers 
have not been signalled by a Member State for the purpose of denying entry . 
This system registers alerts regarding third country nationals who have been 
refused entry to the Schengen area, wanted persons, and persons to be put 
6 However, this may change in the future as the recently adopted Visa Code (Regulation EC 
810/2009) establishes for the first time rules relating to the motivation of refusal of a visa . 
From 5 April 2011 onwards, the authorities processing short-term visa applications will be 
required to motivate their refusal decision by filling in an EU standard form . The standard 
list of grounds for refusal notably comprises ‘one or more Member State(s) consider you 
to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health (…) or the international rela-
tions of one or more of the Member States .’ If EU statistics on the grounds for visa refusal 
are published, it will therefore be possible to gain a better understanding of the number of 
persons who are refused visas on the ground of internal security, although it is unfortunate in 
that respect that ‘internal security’ is part of a broader category, which comprises three other 
grounds for refusal .
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under protection . According to the website of the EU institutions (Europa), 
as of 2008, SIS contained more than 17 million records, the vast majority of 
which concerned lost or stolen items (e .g . identity documents) . There were 
more than one million records concerning wanted persons, the majority of 
which were third country nationals who should be denied entry under Article 
96 of the Schengen Convention . However, it is difficult to assess how many of 
these persons represent a terrorist threat, as some Schengen Member States also 
create records for persons whose application for asylum has been rejected (and 
not only for persons representing a significant threat to national security and 
public order) . Again, this makes it extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness 
of border checks in the EU counter-terrorism policy . This is not to say that the 
current EU migration controls do not contribute to combating terrorism at all . 
They may have prevented prospective terrorists from reaching the EU . How-
ever, such a success is, by definition, extremely difficult to document . Thus, 
to date, the effectiveness of migration controls as an EU counter-terrorism 
instrument has not been demonstrated yet . The extent to which the various 
types of migration control measures adopted by the EU contribute to combating 
terrorism is not known and is actually very difficult to assess . 
A Future Strengthened Role for Migration 
Controls in the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Policy? Current Debates in the EU
Despite the difficulty to assess the effectiveness of migration controls as 
a counter-terrorism instrument in the EU, the European Commission has been 
pressing ahead with various proposals to increase EU migration controls, which 
are notably, albeit not exclusively, justified with regard to their contribution 
to the EU’s fight against terrorism . As a result, the importance of migration 
controls as a dimension of the EU counter-terrorism policy is set to grow even 
further once these instruments are adopted and implemented . Amongst the most 
important and relevant measures outlined below, one can note that several 
concern the development of databases containing data pertaining to asylum 
and migration matters, as well as their interconnection under the banner of 
‘interoperability’ (see De Hert and Gutwirth, 2006) .
The Development of Increasingly Sophisticated 
Databases and their Interconnection
In addition to a second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS 
II) handling biometric identifiers, a Visa Information System (VIS) is to be set 
up to improve the implementation of the common visa policy, consular coopera-
tion and consultation between the central visa authorities . Its main purposes 
are to verify the authenticity of the visa and the identity of its holder on entry . 
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The VIS will record the following data: alphanumerical data on the applicant 
and on the visas requested, issued, refused, annulled, revoked or extended; 
photographs; fingerprint data; and links to previous visa applications and to 
the application files of persons travelling together . The creation of the VIS 
was decided by a Council Decision in 2004 . It was subsequently decided to 
give designated national authorities responsible for the prevention, detection or 
investigation of terrorist or other serious criminal offences, as well as Europol 
officials, access to VIS data through central access points (European Union, 
2008) . Member States considered that the information contained in the VIS 
may be necessary for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism (as 
well as other forms of serious crime) and that it should therefore be available 
provided that the conditions set out in the Decision are fulfilled . Access to VIS 
data will normally only be granted after a duly reasoned request has been made . 
Only in urgent cases will verifications of the requests be carried out ex-post . In 
addition, personal data may be transferred to third countries or to international 
organisations for the purpose of preventing and detecting terrorist and other 
serious offences . In such cases, the consent of the Member State that entered 
the data into the VIS will have to be obtained .
However, despite all these legislative developments, it is important to note 
that the VIS is still not operational yet . The starting date of its operations 
has been postponed several times because of technical problems affecting the 
development of both the central system and VIS preparations at the national 
level, in three countries in particular . In order to support the implementation of 
the VIS, a group of ‘Friends of the VIS’ was established in October 2008, which 
is chaired by the Presidency of the Council and comprises a senior official of 
each state participating in the VIS, as well as a representative of the European 
Commission (Council of the European Union, 2008) . Its main aim is to ensure 
the coordination of all the measures to be taken by Member States to ensure 
the implementation of the VIS, including the use of the system for checks at 
external borders and the monitoring of all technical testing activities . Despite 
all these efforts, the implementation of the VIS is still significantly delayed . 
A report from October 2009 indicates that ‘the start of operations of the VIS 
will be delayed beyond September 2010’ (Council of the European Union, 
2009: 2), whilst the European Commission indicates that the VIS will be ‘fully 
operational in 2012 at the earliest’ (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008: 3) . 
In addition, the European Commission submitted a proposal for the access 
of authorities responsible for internal security matters and Europol to informa-
tion contained in EURODAC in September 2009 . EURODAC is an existing EU 
database that stores the fingerprint data of asylum-seekers at the time of their 
request for asylum . It was created in order to facilitate the application of the 
Dublin Regulation, which determines the Member State responsible for exam-
ining an asylum application by comparing the fingerprints of asylum-seekers . 
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By comparing fingerprints, Member States can determine whether an asylum-
seeker or a foreign national found illegally present within a Member State has 
previously claimed asylum in another Member State, or whether an asylum 
applicant entered the Union territory unlawfully . According to the European 
Commission, the law enforcement authorities of some Member States consult 
national databases containing fingerprint of asylum-seekers for criminal inves-
tigations and ‘consider the hit rate significant’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009: 2) . This has therefore prompted the Commission to table 
a proposal to ensure that law enforcement authorities can compare fingerprint 
data with the fingerprint data of the other EU Member States through the use of 
EURODAC . This proposal is currently under negotiation in the Council work-
ing groups . However, it has been sharply criticised, notably by the European 
Data Protection Supervisor who deplored that it ‘[constitutes] a further step in 
a tendency towards giving law enforcement authorities access to data of indi-
viduals who in principle are not suspected of committing any crime’ (European 
Data Protection Supervisor, 2009: 5; emphasis in the original) .
An EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) System
In addition, the establishment of an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) sys-
tem is currently under discussion, following the presentation by the European 
Commission of a Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data for law enforcement purposes (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2007) . The Commission has presented this EU PNR system as a ma-
jor tool in the fight against terrorism and organised crime (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008: 4) . According to its Impact Assessment study, 
this system would be extremely useful by (1) allowing for the identification of 
known terrorists and criminals (by running the PNR data against alert systems), 
passengers connected to a known terrorist or criminal, and ‘high risk passen-
gers’ (according to specific characteristics and behavioural patterns or risk 
intelligence) and (2) by providing intelligence on travel patterns associations 
after a terrorist attack (Brouwer, 2009: 4) . This proposal and its subsequent 
versions rewritten by the Council have proved very controversial as they raise 
many issues concerning data protection and human rights (Brouwer, 2009) . 
Compared to the API covered by the 2004 Directive, the PNR data would be 
more extensive . Another major difference between the two instruments is that 
the 2004 Directive concerning the API only requires the transmission of data 
in response to a prior request, whereas the proposed PNR Framework Decision 
includes the obligation of systematically transmitting the required data for each 
flight concerned .  This Framework Decision is still under negotiation at the 
time of writing .
Thus, despite the uncertainty as to the effectiveness of migration controls as 
EU counter-terrorism instruments, a considerable number of proposals relating 
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to migration controls are currently under negotiation in the EU that have largely 
been justified in terms of their contribution to counter-terrorism . Should they 
be adopted, they would further strengthen the importance of migration controls 
as an EU counter-terrorism instrument . It is therefore particularly important 
to further reflect upon the issue of their effectiveness, which also has to be 
balanced against their negative externalities .
‘The Right Way to Go?’ Effectiveness 
versus Externalities of Migration Controls 
as an EU Counter-Terrorism Instrument
As is the case with other counter-terrorism instruments, such as measures 
targeting terrorist financing, the effectiveness of migration controls to combat 
terrorism is still open to question . To date, the EU institutions have not provided 
any analysis of the impact and success of using migration controls in the fight 
against terrorism . Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that it is particu-
larly challenging to assess the effectiveness of migration controls to combat 
terrorism . This is because the best indicator of their success is the absence of 
terrorist attacks . However, it is impossible to conclusively prove that a terrorist 
attack did not take place because of one specific counter-terrorism instrument, 
rather than another, as information on non-existent terrorist attacks is by defini-
tion scarce . Nevertheless, it is important to consider this issue of effectiveness 
given the significant impact of some of the migration control measures adopted 
on important issues such as privacy and data protection .
Given these challenges, how might one attempt to evaluate the effective-
ness of migration controls in the EU counter-terrorism policy? For the reasons 
explained above, it is not possible to measure the precise impact of migration 
controls on combating terrorism in the EU, but one can nevertheless examine 
whether such measures are likely to have a positive impact by tackling an 
important cause for concern . In that respect, data gathered and presented by 
Europol in its annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TESAT Re-
ports) can shed light on the extent to which migration controls are an effective 
instrument in the EU’s fight against terrorism . Table 1 presents figures of the 
number of failed, foiled and successfully executed terrorist attacks per type 
of terrorist groups in 2006-2008 . It shows that the overwhelming majority of 
planned or successful terrorist attacks in the EU are due to separatist terror-
ist groups (84 .8 %) . A closer look at the TESAT Reports shows that the vast 
majority of these attacks occur in two countries, namely Spain and France, 
and are claimed by, or attributed to, Basque and Corsican separatist groups 
respectively . In Spain, ETA (Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna) uses violence to promote 
the independence of the Basque region, whereas groups such as the Front 
National de Libération de  la Corse seek the independence of Corsica from 
Migration Controls and EU Counter-Terrorism | 45
France . Given that the ethno-nationalist goals pursued by these groups are 
rather local and do not have a global scope, they recruit locally . It seems highly 
unlikely that individuals would have to cross the external borders of the EU to 
commit the terrorist offences associated with these separatist terrorist groups . 
Migration control measures are therefore inadequate instruments to prevent 
most terrorist attacks that take place in the EU . From this viewpoint, it can be 
argued that the use of migration controls by the EU to fight terrorism can only 
have very limited effectiveness given the nature and characteristics of the most 
active terrorist groups in the EU .
Table 1: Number of failed, foiled and successful executed attacks in all EU 
Member States per year (2006-2008) and per type of terrorist group
Year Islamist Separatist Left-wing Right-wing Other or not 
specified
Total
2006 1 424 55 1 17 498
2007 4 532 21 1 25 583
2008 0 397 28 0 90 515
Total
(%)
5
(0.31 %)
1353
(84.78 %)
104
(6.52 %)
2
(0.12 %)
132
(8.27 %)
1596
(100 %)
Sources: Europol (2007; 2008; 2009) 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that any analysis should not 
only consider the occurrence of terrorist attacks, but also their severity . Separa-
tist terrorist groups in Spain and France generally aim to cause material damage 
(Europol, 2008) . In contrast, the attacks carried out by Islamist terrorist groups 
generally aim to cause mass casualties (Hoffman, 2006) . Thus, although the 
number of Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU - be they successful, failed or 
foiled - has been rather limited over the last few years, their political impact 
has been significant . This is because of the high number of casualties caused by 
successful Islamist terrorist attacks, as demonstrated by the attacks in Madrid 
(2004) and London (2005) . Although some of the perpetrators of these terrorist 
attacks were ‘home-grown terrorists’, some were third country nationals who 
crossed the EU external borders at some point . From that viewpoint, one may 
therefore argue that migration controls may be a useful counter-terrorism tool 
to prevent these individuals from entering the EU territory and execute deadly 
terrorist attacks . Even if the number of terrorist incidents associated with that 
type of terrorist groups is small, it is particularly important to prevent them 
because of the higher risk of mass casualties inherent to them .
However, this possible increase in security – which is impossible to conclu-
sively demonstrate, as explained earlier – has to be put in balance against the 
negative effects of the strengthening of migration controls . Using an economics 
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concept, the latter can be referred to as ‘negative externalities’, that is, the costs 
experienced by unrelated parties – i .e . all the third-country nationals who are 
not involved in terrorist activities in this case . One can identify three main 
categories of negative externalities . First of all, the strengthening of migra-
tion controls has made it more difficult to travel and enter the EU, including 
for some bona fide travellers without any connection to terrorism .7 This has 
notably been well-documented by scholars examining the development of the 
EU cooperation on visas (Bigo and Guild, 2003; 2005; Trauner and Kruse, 
2008) . In addition, it can be argued that using migration controls as a counter-
terrorist instrument may have a harmful effect on the relations between vari-
ous ethnic groups in multicultural societies by presenting asylum-seekers and 
migrants as potential terrorists (Guild, 2003a; 2003b) . Finally, the development 
of migration control measures to fight terrorism raises significant questions 
with regard to the right to privacy and data protection . An increasing number 
of personal data concerning third-country nationals wishing to enter the EU 
is already being collected and stored . This trend will be reinforced if the new 
EU instruments currently under discussion are adopted and enter into force . In 
addition, as has been explained before, there have been several moves towards 
interconnecting various databases that contain some sensitive data and that 
were originally designed for different purposes than the fight against terrorism . 
This is a controversial development with regard to data protection (Mitsilegas, 
2007; Mitsilegas, 2009a) .
Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that migration controls have become an in-
creasingly important component of EU counter-terrorism policy over the last 
few years . After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, strengthening EU 
cooperation on migration controls was identified amongst various actions to 
be taken, but was not given any priority . It is only after the terrorist attacks in 
Madrid in March 2004 that it was identified as a strategic objective in the EU 
fight against terrorism . Since then, this dimension of the EU counter-terrorism 
policy has continued to grow in importance . This trend is set to continue in 
the future, as a significant number of proposals regarding migration control 
measures are currently being negotiated in the EU . 
However, this article has showed that the development of these initiatives 
has not been justified by any systematic analysis of the success of migration 
controls as a counter-terrorism instrument . The EU has not demonstrated the 
7 It is important to note that the European Commission has implicitly acknowledged this prob-
lem when tabling a new ‘border package’ in February 2008 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008) . It has suggested addressing it by taking measures to facilitate border 
crossing for bona fide travellers, such as the introduction of a ‘Registered Traveller’ status and 
a simplified and automated border check .
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effectiveness of migration controls in the fight against terrorism, although this 
article has acknowledged the considerable challenges inherent to such a demon-
stration . Nevertheless, whilst it is unclear to which extent reinforced migration 
controls contribute to combating terrorism, it has become increasingly evident 
that they have negative externalities, notably as far as the right to privacy 
and data protection are concerned . The creation of an expanding number of 
databases containing data pertaining to asylum and migration matters and the 
emphasis put on their ‘interoperability’ for use in the fight against terrorism 
are particularly good examples . Given the lack of robust justification for and 
demonstration of the effectiveness of using such instruments for fighting terror-
ism, it might therefore be argued that resources and energy may be better spent 
by focusing more closely on those involved in terrorist activities, through the 
enhanced sharing of intelligence for example, rather than adopting measures 
negatively affecting all third-country nationals indiscriminately .
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